This paper investigates whether stable political regimes develop stable systems of rules that are conducive to growth, similar to property rights. New measures of political stability indicate that stable political systems stimulate growth in developing autocratic countries. Contrarily, political instability significantly reduces growth in autocracies, as instability creates a time-consistency problem. In some specifications, an instability measure has significant negative growth effects in democracies, and may be an alternative to measures of property rights. Similarly, ethnic fractionalization reduces growth in autocracies, but not developing democracies. Tests indicate that these results are not sensitive to extreme values in the data. JEL no. O40, H11
Introduction
Studies of the determinants of growth have established the importance of property rights in creating a positive growth environment. Establishing a stable system of property rights facilitates long-term commitments, particularly investment. With the potential returns to economic decisions protected by property rights, agents are free to pursue those opportunities offering the greatest potential returns, thereby stimulating growth.
Durable political regimes may be an alternative to property rights. Durable regimes can establish stable rules governing economic behavior. As long as the rules are clear and stable, regardless of regime type, people find ways to maximize their utility. Alternatively, unstable regimes create a time-inconsistency problem, as rules governing economic (and other) behavior may be constantly changing. Optimal behavior changes when the rules are variable.
Stable political systems are able to cope with a variety of problems, including economic and financial crises, domestic conflicts and civil war. A stable regime should possess the capacity to resolve the problem or crisis, and most importantly survive. A long-lived autocracy can establish a stable system of rules that foster growth. In an autocracy each regime change can create uncertainty about the continuity of rules. Rule uncertainty is time inconsistent, and likely discourages growth.
In this paper we report the results of an investigation of the impact of regime stability on growth. Our maintained hypothesis is that regime stability can be as important for growth as property rights, especially for autocratic regimes. That is, regime stability, and not just property rights, fosters growth. Since data for regime stability are available for a larger number of developing countries than exist for property rights data, our sample includes a much larger number of countries than studies investigating the effects of property rights on growth.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on political stability and economic growth. Section 3 describes the standard growth model, data, and data sources used in the analysis. Section 4 reports the estimation results for the various measures of polity stability. In this section, we also examine some econometric problems that potentially affect cross-country growth estimates. Section 5 discusses a case consistent with the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
It is typically assumed that the stability of political systems has concomitant economic values because of its undeniable common sense appealinvestors prefer predictability, security, and safety. It is commonly believed that political stability is a necessary condition for growth and prosperity. Previous studies note very different channels through which political instability adversely affects economic growth. A number of papers 1 argue that governments in politically unstable and polarized countries are more likely to adopt inefficient or suboptimal policies such as an inefficient tax system, higher present government consumption, or accumulation of larger external debts, all of which have adverse growth effects in the long run.
